American chief executives stand apart from the executive-branch agencies they are expected to lead. Unlike most modern bureaucrats, these leaders obtain their positions through elections or are answerable directly to elected officials. American chief executives stand apart from the executive-branch agencies they are expected to lead. Unlike most modern bureaucrats, these leaders obtain their positions through elections or are answerable directly to elected officials.

Chief executives are expected to set general policy directions and to provide the leadership necessary to manage government agencies and programs. Chief executives require deliberate strategies and effective influence if they are to succeed in directing administrative behavior toward fulfillment of their policy objectives. In the formulation of broad policy directions, executive leadership has been evident, especially in the past five decades. The ability of individual chief executives to influence their bureaucracies significantly cannot be taken for granted.

Chief executives’ control is frequently challenged by external forces like the legislative branch, the judiciary, the media, or others who seek a voice in agency decisions. More important, in many instances, their authority to lead is challenged from within, by members of their own political party. Presidents (and most governors and many mayors) have diverse and frequently disunited coalitions of political support that do not enable them to operate with a free hand or to speak with a consistent voice on all issues.

Bureaucracies, on the other hand, have a limited range of policy interests because they are more specialized with narrower bases of support. By concentrating its efforts in one policy area, an agency can develop support and expertise and convert these diverse interests into political resources. These resources, in turn, gain the support of those in the legislature and the public who seek favorable agency treatment of their interests. To persuade public bureaucracies to follow their lead, chief executives must convince agency personnel that there will be reciprocal political and fiscal support for their specialized program interests.

When agency programs clearly occupy a low priority on a chief executive’s policy agenda, the agency may adapt procedurally to the executive’s priorities. This is indicative of the agency’s fear of retribution from an unfriendly or hostile chief executive. Even if policy differences continue to exist, both agencies and chief executives continue to advance their interests. Control from one or the other side is rarely complete, but the conflict over control and power is ongoing.